atisfaction, and leadership style. A major concern when attitudes are employed as indicators is construct validity , that is, whether the specific items used are valid measures of the underlying concept. In the powerlessness exam- ple, the connection between the content of the item and the concept may seem obvious, but even in cases like this it is important to demonstrate validity. A variety of analytic techniques may be used, including interitem correlations, factor analy- sis, and LISREL. Indicators of Social Change. Two methodo- logical developments have made it possible to use attitudes to study social change. The first was the development of probability sampling techniques, which allow the investigator to make inferences about the characteristics of a population from the results obtained by surveying a sample of that population. The second is the use of the same attitude measures in surveys of representative sam- ples at two or more points in time. A major source of such data is the General Social Survey (GSS), an annual survey of a proba- bility sample of adults. The GSS repeats a core set of items on a roughly annual basis, making possi- ble the study of changes over a period of thirty years. Many of these items were drawn directly from earlier surveys, making comparisons over a forty- or fifty-year timespan possible. A published book describes these items and presents the re- sponses obtained each time the item was used (Niemi, Mueller, and Smith 1989). Other sources of such data include the National Election Studies and the Gallup Polls. This use of attitude items reflects a general concern with social change at the societal level. The investigator uses aggregate measures of atti- tudes in the population as an index of changes in cultural values and social institutions. Two areas of particular interest are attitudes toward race and gender roles. In both areas, efforts have been made to improve access to educational programs, jobs, and professions, increase wages and salaries, and provide greater opportunity for advancement. The availability of responses to the same attitude items over time allows us to assess the consistency between these social changes and attitudes in the population. Consider the question ‘‘Do you think civil rights leaders are trying to push too fast, are going too slowly, or are moving at about the right speed?’’ This question was asked in surveys of national samples every two years from 1964 to 1976 and in 1980. The percentage of whites reply- ing ‘‘too fast’’ declined from 74 percent in 1964 to 40 percent in 1980 (Bobo 1988), suggesting in- creased white support for the black movement. In general, research indicates that both racial and gender-role attitudes became more liberal between 1960 and 1990, and this finding is consistent with the social changes in these areas. Other topics that have been studied include attitudes toward abor- tion, social class identification, and subjective quali- ty of life. There are several issues involved in this use of attitude items. The first is the problem of ‘‘nonattitudes.’’ Respondents may answer survey questions or endorse statements even though they have no attitude toward the object. In fact, when respondents are questioned about fictional ob- jects or organizations, some of them will express an opinion. Schuman and Kalton (1985) discuss ATTITUDES 191 this issue in detail and suggest ways to reduce the extent to which nonattitudes are given by respondents. The second issue involves the interpretation of responses to items. In the example above, the analyst assumes that white respondents who reply ‘‘Too fast’’ feel threatened by the movement. How- ever, there is evidence that small changes in the wording of survey items can produce substantial changes in aggregate response patterns. This evi- dence and guidelines for writing survey items are discussed in Schuman and Presser (1996). Finally, there is the problem of equivalence in meaning over time. In order to make meaningful comparisons across time, the items need to be the same or equivalent. Yet over time the meaning of an item may change. Consider the item ‘‘Are you in favor of desegregation , strict segregation , or some- thing in between?’’ This question was asked of national samples in 1964 and every two years from 1968 to 1978. From 1964 to 1970, the percentage of white, college-educated adults endorsing deseg- regation increased; from 1970 to 1978, the per- centage decreased steadily. Until 1970, desegrega- tion efforts were focused on the South; after 1970, desegregation efforts focused on school integra- tion in northern cities. Evidence suggests that endorsement of desegregation changed because the meaning of the question for white adults changed (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). REFERENCES Allport, Gordon W. 1985 ‘‘The Historical Background of Social Psychology.’’ In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology , 3rd ed. New York: Random House. Bargh, John A. 1996 ‘‘Automaticity in Social Psycholo- gy.’’ In E.T. Higgins and A. Kruglanski, eds., Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles . New York: The Guilford Press. Bobo, Lawrence 1988 ‘‘Attitudes toward the Black Po- litical Movement: Trends, Meaning, and Effects on Racial Policy Preference.’’ Social Psychology Quarterly 51:287–302. Dawes, Robyn M., and Tom L. Smith 1985 ‘‘Attitude and Opinion Measurement.’’ In G.Lindzey and E. Aronson, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology , 3rd ed. New York: Random House. Eagly, Alice, and Shelly Chaiken 1998 ‘‘Attitude Struc- ture and Function.’’ In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology , 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. Felson, Richard B. 1996 ‘‘Mass Media Effects on Violent Behavior.’’ In J. Hagen and K. Cook, eds., Annual Review of Sociology , vol. 22. Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews. Festinger, Leon 1957 A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Fishbein, Martin, and Icek Ajzen 1975 Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior . Reading, Mass.: Addision-Wesley. Geen, Russel 1998 ‘‘Aggression and Antisocial Behav- ior.’’ In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey, eds., Handboook of Social Psychology , 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. Kiecolt, K. Jill 1988 ‘‘Recent Developments in Attitudes and Social Structure.’’ In W. R. Scott and J. Blake. eds., Annual Review of Sociology , vol. 14. Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews. Kinder, Donald R., and David O. Sears 1985 ‘‘Public Opinion and Political Action.’’ In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology , 3rd ed. New York: Random House. Kraus, S.J. 1995 ‘‘Attitudes and the Prediction of Behav- ior: A Meta-Analysis of the Emperical Literature.’’ Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 18:152–162. McGuire, William J. 1985 ‘‘Attitudes and Attitude Change.’’ In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, eds., Hand- book of Social Psychology , 3rd ed. New York: Ran- dom House. Niemi, Richard G., John Mueller, and Tom W. Smith 1989 Trends in Public Opinion: A Compendium of Sur- vey Data . New York: Greenwood Press. Perloff, R. M. 1993 The Dynamics of Persuasion . Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. Petty, Richard, and John Cacioppo 1986 ‘‘The Elabora- tion–Likelihood Model of Persuasion.’’ Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 19:123–205. Petty, Richard, Duane Wegener, and Leandre Fabrigan 1997 ‘‘Attitudes and Attitude Change.’’ Annual Re- view of Psychology 48:609–647. Roberts, Donald F., and Nathan Maccoby 1985 ‘‘Effects of Mass Communication.’’ In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology , 3rd ed. New York: Random House. Schuman, Howard 1995 ‘‘Attitudes, Beliefs, and Behav- ior.’’ In K. S. Cook, G. A. Finc, and J. S. House, eds., Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology . Boston: Allyn and Bacon. ———, and Stanley Presser 1996 Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys . Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. ATTRIBUTION THEORY 192 Schuman, Howard, and Graham Kalton 1985 ‘‘Survey Methods.’’ In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, eds., Hand- book of Social Psychology , 3rd ed. New York: Ran- dom House. Schuman, Howard, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo 1985 Racial Attitudes in America . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Wegener, Duane T., Richard E. Petty, and Stephen M. Smith 1995 ‘‘Positive Mood can Increase or Decrease Message Scrutiny: The Hedonic Contingency View of Mood and Message Processing.’’ Journal of Person- ality and Social Psychology 69:5–15. JOHN D. DELAMATER ATTRIBUTION THEORY Attribution is a cognitive process that entails link- ing an event to its causes. Attribution is one of a variety of cognitive inferences that are included within social cognition, which is one of several theoretical models within social psychology. Social cognition has been the most dominant social psy- chological perspective within psychology since the 1960s, and this is evident in the popularity of research on attribution. In the mid-1970s, as much as 50 percent of the articles in major social psy- chology journals concerned attributional process- es, in part because attribution theory is relevant to the study of person perception, event perception, attitude change, the acquisition of self-knowledge, and a host of applied topics including therapeutic interventions, close relationships, legal and medi- cal decision making, and so forth. Although the proportion of published research that focused on this topic declined during the 1980s, attribution remains one of the more popular fields of social psychological research. DEFINITION An attribution is an inference about why an event occurred. More generally, ‘‘attribution is a process that begins with social perception, progresses through a causal judgment and social inference, and ends with behavioral consequences’’ (Crittenden 1983, p. 426). Although most theories of and research on attribution focus on causal inference, empirical research has dealt with attributions not only of cause but also of blame and responsibility. Although these types of attributions are closely related, they are not conceptually identical. Fur- thermore, because personality characteristics con- stitute a major category of potential causes of behavior, attributions about individuals’ traits (both one’s own traits and those of others) have received explicit theoretical attention. MAJOR THEORIES OF ATTRIBUTION Even though attribution has been one of the most popular social psychological research topics in the social sciences, only a few theories of attribution have been developed. The study of attribution began with Fritz Heider’s (1958) original attempt to provide a systematic, conceptual explanation of ‘‘naive’’ psychology. Heider maintained that peo- ple strive to understand, predict, and control events in their everyday lives in much the same way as scientists do in their professional lives. On the basis of observation, individuals form theories about their social worlds, and new observations then serve to support, refute, or modify these theories. Because people act on the basis of their beliefs, Heider argued that it is important to un- derstand this layperson’s psychology. Although Heider did not develop an explicit theory of attri- bution, he did assert several principles that have guided all subsequent theorizing on this topic. Primary among these principles is the notion that people are inclined to attribute actions to stable or enduring causes rather than to transitory factors. Heider also stressed the importance of distinguishing unintentional from intentional be- havior, a distinction that has been particularly influential in theories of the attribution of respon- sibility. He identified environmental and personal factors as two general classes of factors that pro- duce action and hypothesized that an inverse rela- tionship exists between these two sets of causes. He also suggested that the ‘‘covariational princi- ple’’ is fundamental to attribution: An effect is attributed to a factor that is present when the effect is present and to a factor that is absent when the effect is absent. Heider’s early analyses of social perception represent a general conceptual framework about common sense, implicit theories people use in understanding events in their daily lives. The two most influential theories of attribu- tion are based on Heider’s work but go beyond it ATTRIBUTION THEORY 193 in the development of more systematic statements about attributional processes. Covariational model. Harold Kelley’s (1967, 1973) covariational model of attribution addresses the question of whether a given behavior is caused by an actor or, alternatively, by an environmental stimulus with which the actor engages. According to this model, the attribution of cause is based on three types of information: consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency. Consensus refers to the similarity between the actor’s behavior and the behavior of other people in similar circumstances. Distinctiveness refers to the generality of the actor’s behavior: Does she or he behave in this way toward stimuli in general, or is the behavior specific to this stimulus? Consistency refers to the actor’s behavior toward this stimulus across time and modality. There are many possible combinations of these three types of information, but Kelley makes explicit predic- tions about just three. The combination of high consensus, high distinctiveness, and high consis- tency supports an attribution to the environmen- tal stimulus, whereas a profile of low consensus, low distinctiveness, and high consistency supports an attribution to the actor. When the behavior is inconsistent, regardless of the level of consensus or distinctiveness, an attribution to circumstances is predicted. Empirical tests of Kelley’s model have focused either on the effects of a particular type of infor- mation or, more in keeping with his formulation, on the effects of particular patterns of information (McArthur 1972). In an innovative analysis, Miles Hewstone and Jos Jaspars (1987) proposed a dif- ferent logic (although one consistent with Kelley’s model), suggesting that potential attributers con- sider whether different causal loci are necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an effect. They conclude that the notion of causality is flexible and thus assert that there may be some advantage to conceiving of situation-specific no- tions of causality. More recent work has examined the universality and external validity of Kelley’s model. Irina Anderson and Geoffrey Beattie (1998), for example, analyzed actual conversations be- tween men and women talking about rape. They found that men tended to use the reasoning out- lined in Kelley’s model by making reference to consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency, as well as by using these types of information to formulate attributions for behavior. Women, on the other hand, made less use of these variables and intro- duced the variable of ‘‘foreseeability’’ into their analyses. Correspondent inference. The theory of cor- respondent inference (Jones and Davis 1965; Jones and McGillis 1976) addresses the attribution of personality traits to actors on the basis of their behavior and focuses on attributions about per- sons in greater depth than does Kelley’s covariational model. These two theories thus address different questions. Kelley asks: When do we attribute an event to an actor or to some stimulus in the environment? Edward Jones asks: When do we attribute a trait to an actor on the basis of her or his behavior? The theory of correspondent inference focuses more narrowly on the actor but also yields more information about the actor in that it speci- fies what it is about the actor that caused the behavior. Jones and his coauthors predict that two factors guide attributions: (1) the attributer’s prior expectancies for behavior, specifically, expectancies based either on knowledge of earlier behaviors of the actor (target-based) or on the actor’s social category memberships (category-based), and (2) the profile of effects that follow from the behavior- al choices available to the actor. Edward Jones and Daniel McGillis propose that expectancies determine the degree of confi- dence with which a particular trait is attributed; the lower the expectancy of behavior, the more confident the attribution. The profile of effects helps the attributer identify what trait might have produced the behavior in question. Noncommon effects—effects that follow from only one of the behavioral options—provide information about the particular disposition. The fewer the noncommon effects, the clearer the attribution. Thus, behavior that contradicts prior expectancies and a profile of behavioral choices with few noncommon effects combine to maximize the possibility of attributing a disposition to the actor (a correspondent infer- ence). Empirical research generally has supported these predictions. These two models share some attributional principles. Expectancy variables (target-based and category-based) are analogous to Kelley’s types of information. Although the predicted effects of consensus information and its analogue, category- based expectancies, are compatible, the predicted ATTRIBUTION THEORY 194 effects of consistency and distinctiveness informa- tion and their analogue, target-based expectancies, present some incompatibilities. This contradic- tion has been evaluated both conceptually and empirically (Howard and Allen 1990). Attribution in achievement situations. Ber- nard Weiner (1974) and his colleagues have ap- plied attributional principles in the context of achievement situations. According to this model, we make inferences about an individual’s success on the basis of the individual’s ability to do the task in question, how much effort is expended, how difficult the task is, and to what extent luck may have influenced the outcome. Other possible caus- al factors have since been added to this list. More important perhaps is Weiner’s development of, first, a structure of causal dimensions in terms of which these causal factors can be described and, second, the implications of the dimensional stand- ing of a given causal factor (Weiner, Russell, and Lerman 1978). The major causal dimensions are locus (internal or external to the actor), stability or instability, and intentionality or unintentionality of the factor. Thus, for example, ability is inter- nal, stable, and unintentional. The stability of a causal factor primarily affects judgments about expectancies for future behavior, whereas locus and intentionality primarily affect emotional re- sponses to behavior. This model has been used extensively in educational research and has guided therapeutic educational efforts such as attribution retraining. Cross-cultural research has explored the cultural generalizability of these models. Paul Tuss, Jules Zimmer, and Hsiu-Zu Ho (1995) and Donald Mizokawa and David Rickman (1990) re- port, for instance, that Asian and Asian American students are more likely to attribute academic failure and success to effort than are European American students, who are more likely to attrib- ute performance to ability. European American students are also more likely to attribute failure to task difficulty. Interestingly, as Asian Americans spend more time in the United States, they place less emphasis on the role of effort in performance. Attribution biases. The theoretical models described above are based on the assumption that social perceivers follow the dictates of logical or rational models in assessing causality. Empirical research has demonstrated, not surprisingly, that there are systematic patterns in what has been variously conceived of as bias or error in the attribution process (Ross 1977). Prominent among these is what has been called the ‘‘fundamental attribution error,’’ the tendency of perceivers to overestimate the role of dispositional factors in shaping behavior and to underestimate the impact of situational factors. One variant of this bias has particular relevance for sociologists. This is the general tendency to make inadequate allowance for the role-based nature of much social behavior. That is, perceivers fail to recognize that behavior often derives from role memberships rather than from individual idiosyncrasy. Again, cross-cultural research has called into question the generalizability of this bias. Joan Miller (1984) shows that the tendency to attribute behavior to persons is mark- edly more prominent in the United States, among both adults and children, whereas a tendency to attribute behavior to situational factors is more prominent among Indian Hindus, both adults and children, calling into question the ‘‘fundamentalness’’ of this attributional pattern. A second systematic pattern is the actor-ob- server difference, in which actors tend to attribute their own behavior to situational factors, whereas observers of the same behavior tend to attribute it to the actor’s dispositions. A third pattern con- cerns what have been called self-serving or egocen- tric biases, that is, attributions that in some way favor the self. According to the false consensus bias, for example, we tend to see our own behav- ioral choices and judgments as relatively common and appropriate whereas those that differ from ours are perceived as uncommon and deviant. There has been heated debate about whether these biases derive from truly egotistical motives or reflect simple cognitive and perceptual errors. METHODOLOGICAL AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES The prevalent methodologies and measurement strategies within attributional research have been vulnerable to many of the criticisms directed more generally at social cognition and to some directed specifically at attribution. The majority of attributional research has used structured response formats to assess attributions. Heider’s original distinction between person and environmental cause has had a major influence on the development of these structured measures. Respondents typically are asked to rate the importance of situational and ATTRIBUTION THEORY 195 dispositional causes of events. These ratings have been obtained on ipsative scales as well as on independent rating scales. Ipsative measures pose these causes as two poles on one dimension; thus, an attribution of cause to the actor’s disposition is also a statement that situational factors are not causal. This assumed inverse relationship between situational and dispositional causality has been rejected on conceptual and empirical grounds. In more recent studies, therefore, respondents as- sign each type of causality separately. (Ipsative measures are appropriate for answering some ques- tions, however, such as whether the attribution of cause to one actor comes at the expense of attribu- tion to another actor or to society.) In theory, then, both dispositional and situational variables could be identified as causal factors. The breadth of these two categories has also been recognized as a problem. Dispositional causes may include a wide variety of factors such as stable traits and attitudes, unstable moods and emotions, and intentional choices. Situational cause is per- haps an even broader category. It is quite possible that these categories are so broad as to render a single measure of each virtually meaningless. Thus, researchers often include both general and more specific, narrower responses as possible choices (e.g., choices of attributing blame to an assailant or to the situation might be refined to the assailant’s use of a weapon, physical size, and psychological state, on the one hand, and the location, time of day, and number of people nearby, on the other). Structured measures of attributions are vul- nerable to the criticism that the categories of causes presented to respondents are not those they use in their everyday attributions. Recogniz- ing this limitation, a few researchers have used open-ended measures. Comparative studies of the relative utility of several different types of meas- ures of causal attributions conclude that scale methods perform somewhat better in terms of their inter-test validity and reliability, although open-ended measures are preferable when research- ers are exploring causal attributions in new situa- tions. Some researchers have attempted to over- come some of the limitations of existing scales; Curtis McMillen and Susan Zuravin (1997), for example, have developed and refined ‘‘Attributions of Responsibility’’ and ‘‘Blame Scales’’ for use in clinical research that may be useful for other kinds of attributional situations. The great majority of attribution studies use stimuli of highly limited social meaning. General- ly, the behavior is represented with a brief written vignette, often just a single sentence. Some re- searchers have shifted to the presentation of visual stimuli, typically with videotaped rather than actu- al behavioral sequences, in order to ensure comparability across experimental conditions. Rec- ognizing the limitations of brief, noncontextualized stimuli, a few researchers have begun to use a greater variety of more extended stimuli including newspaper reports and published short stories. Most of these stimuli, including the videotaped behavioral sequences, rely heavily on language to convey the meaning of behavior. Conceptual at- tention has turned recently to how attribution relies on language and to the necessity of consider- ing explicitly what that reliance means. Some re- searchers (Anderson and Beattie 1998; Antaki and Leudar 1992) have attempted to use more natural- istic approaches, incorporating into the study the analysis of spontaneous conversations among study participants. WHEN DO WE MAKE ATTRIBUTIONS? Long after attribution had attained its popularity in social psychology, a question that perhaps should have been raised much earlier began to receive attention: When do we make attributions? To what extent are the attributions in this large body of research elicited by the experimental procedures themselves? This is a question that can be directed to any form of social cognition. It is particularly relevant, however, to attribution. Most people, confronted with a form on which they are to answer the question ‘‘Why?,’’ do so. There is no way of knowing, within the typical experimental paradigm, whether respondents would make attributions on their own. In a sense there are two questions: Do people make attributions spontane- ously, and if they do, under what circumstances do they do so? In response to the first question, Weiner (1985) has marshaled impressive evidence that people do indeed make attributions spontaneously. Inven- tive procedures have been developed for assessing the presence of attributional processing that is not directly elicited. This line of evidence has dealt almost entirely with causal attributions. Research ATTRIBUTION THEORY 196 suggests that trait attributions may be made spon- taneously much more often than causal attributions. In response to the second question, a variety of studies suggest that people are most likely to make attributions when they encounter unexpected events or events that have negative implications for them. SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ATTRIBUTION Attribution is a cognitive process of individuals; much of the extant research on attribution is, accordingly, highly individualistic. In the 1980s, however, researchers began to pay increasing at- tention to the sociological relevance of attribu- tion. The process of attribution itself is fundamen- tally social. Attribution occurs not only within individuals but also at the interpersonal, inter- group, and societal levels. Moreover, the process of attribution may underlie basic sociological phe- nomena such as labeling and stratification. Interpersonal attribution. At the interperson- al level, attribution is basic to social interaction. Interpersonal encounters are shaped in many ways by attributional patterns. Behavioral confirmation, or self-fulfilling prophecies, illustrate the behav- ioral consequences of attribution in social interac- tion; attribution of specific characteristics to social actors creates the expectancies that are then con- firmed in behavior. Considering attribution at this interpersonal level demonstrates the importance of different social roles and perspectives (actors vs. observers) as well as how attribution is related to evaluation. The self is also important to the attri- bution process; the evidence for attributional ego- tism (self-esteem enhancing attributional biases), self-presentation biases, and egocentrism is per- suasive. Attributions also affect social interaction through a widespread confirmatory attribution bias that leads perceivers to conclude that their expectancies have been confirmed in social interaction. Research has challenged the universality of egocentric biases by examining differences in attributional styles according to race, class, and gender. Several studies (Reese and Brown 1995; Wiley and Crittenden 1992; Broman 1992; An- drews and Brewin 1990) have shown that women are less likely than men to make self-serving dispo- sitions. In a study of academics’ accounts of their success in the profession, Mary Glenn Wiley and Kathleen Crittenden (1992) argue that women explain their success in a more modest manner in order to preserve a feminine identity, at the expense of their professional identities. This attributional style may make it more likely for women to blame themselves for various types of negative situations. Consistent with this reason- ing, Bernice Andrews and Chris Brewin (1990) found that female victims of marital violence tend- ed to blame themselves for their experience of violence. Childhood experiences of physical or sexual abuse increased women’s chances of characterological self-blame when, as adults, they found themselves in abusive relationships. (Other research, however, notes that the relationship be- tween attributions and adjustment is complex and not always so straightforward; see McMillen and Zuravin 1997.) Race and class characteristics also create dis- tinct attributional patterns; research on these fac- tors has been more likely than research on gender to consider possible interactive effects on attributions. In a study conducted by Fathali Moghaddam and colleagues (1995) on attributional styles of whites, blacks, and Cubans in Miami, for example, middle- class black respondents were more likely to blame negative outcomes on discrimination than were lower-class blacks. Lower-class whites were the only group to attribute failure to themselves personally. The great preponderance of research on so- cial interaction has been based on relationships between strangers in experimental contexts, which may seem to undermine the claim that attribution is significant for interpersonal interaction. The best evidence of this significance, then, is the increasingly large body of research on the role of attribution in the formation, maintenance, and dissolution of close relationships. There is sub- stantial evidence that attributions are linked to relationship satisfaction and behaviors such as conflict resolution strategies. There is also evi- dence that distressed and nondistressed couples make differing attributions for significant events in their relationships; these patterns may actually serve to maintain marital distress among troubled ATTRIBUTION THEORY 197 couples, thus ultimately influencing marital satis- faction. Attributions also play an important role in relationship dissolution. Attributions are a critical part of the detailed accounts people provide for the dissolution of their relationships, and these accounts go beyond explanation to rationalize and justify the loss of relationships. Research on interpersonal attribution extends the intrapersonal approach in several ways. When people who interact have substantial knowledge of and feelings about each other, the attribution process involves evaluation as well as cognition. Issues of communication, and hence potential changes in preexisting attributions for recurrent relationship events, also become salient at the interpersonal level. There is very little research on how attributions change through interaction and relationships, but this is clearly a significant topic. Attributions at the interpersonal level also entail greater concern with accountability for action; causality at this level also raises issues of justification. Intergroup attribution. Intergroup attribution refers to the ways in which members of different social groups explain the behavior of members of their own and other social groups. At this level, social categorization has a direct impact on attri- bution. Studies using a variety of subjects from different social groups and often different coun- tries show consistent support for an ingroup-serv- ing attributional pattern, for example, a tendency toward more dispositional attributions for posi- tive as opposed to negative behavior for ingroup actors. The evidence for the converse pattern, more dispositional attributions for negative as opposed to positive behavior for outgroup actors, is not as strong. (Moreover, these patterns are stronger in dominant than in dominated groups.) Social desirability biases can counteract this pat- tern; Steven Little, Robert Sterling, and Daniel Tingstrom (1996), for example, found that white respondents held black actors less responsible for participating in a bar fight than did black respon- dents. The authors suggest that this finding may be due to the desire of the white sample—under- graduates from a suburban area—to appear racial- ly progressive. Parallel studies of a group’s success and failure show a consistent pattern of ingroup protection. Outgroup failure is attributed more to lack of ability than is ingroup failure. Effects of group membership on attributions about success are not as strong. Interestingly, there is also some evi- dence of outgroup-favoring and/or ingroup-dero- gating attributions among widely recognized low- er-status, dominated groups such as migrant labor populations (Hewstone 1989). A third form of evidence of intergroup attribution is provided by studies of attributions about social positions occu- pied by existing groups. In general, these studies, like those cited above, show higher ratings of ingroup-serving as opposed to outgroup-serving attributions. Societal attribution. At the societal level, those beliefs shared by the members of a given society form the vocabulary for social attributions. The concept of social representations, which has its origins in Durkheim’s concept of ‘‘representation collectives,’’ was developed by Serge Moscovici (1976) to represent how knowledge is shared by societal members in the form of common-sense theories about that society. Social representations are intimately connected to the process of attribu- tion. Not only are explanation and accountability part of a system of collective representations, but such representations determine when we seek ex- planations. Social representations serve as catego- ries that influence the perception and processing of social information; moreover, they underscore the emphasis on shared social beliefs and knowl- edge. Social representations are useful in inter- preting research on laypersons’ explanations of societal events such as poverty and wealth, unem- ployment, and racial inequality. Poverty tends to be attributed to individualistic factors, for exam- ple, whereas unemployment tends to be attributed to societal factors. Not surprisingly, these patterns may be qualified by attributors’ own class back- grounds; although middle-class people attribute poverty more often to internal factors, those who are themselves poor attribute poverty more often to external factors such as governmental policies (Singh 1989). Gender and racial stereotyping can also shape attributions. Cynthia Willis, Marianne Hallinan, and Jeffrey Melby (1996), for example, found that respondents with a traditional sex-role orientation showed a favorable bias toward the male perpetrator in domestic violence situations. When the female victim was African American and married, both egalitarians and traditionalists were less likely to attribute blame to the man. ATTRIBUTION THEORY 198 Moving away from an emphasis on normative stereotyping, research has considered possible ef- fects of counter-stereotyping on attributional pat- terns, and of attributions on changes in stereo- types. Portrayals of structurally subordinate groups that counter stereotypical expectations can increase the perceived credibility of members of those groups (Power, Murphy, and Coover 1996). Moreo- ver, an attribution of counterstereotypic behavior to dispositional factors of clearly typical outgroup members can modify outgroup stereotypes (Wild- er, Simon, and Faith 1996). Cross-cultural research illustrates another as- pect of societal attributions. This work compares the extent and type of attributional activity across cultures. Although there has been some support for the applicability of Western models of attribu- tion among non-Western cultures, most of this research has demonstrated in a variety of ways the cultural specificity of particular patterns of attribu- tion (Bond 1988). As noted above, for example, Joan Miller (1984) provides cross-cultural empiri- cal evidence that the fundamental attribution er- ror, the tendency to attribute cause more to per- sons than to situations, is characteristic of Western but not non-Western societies. Attributions about the self also vary across cultures; members of some non-Western cultures attribute performance more to effort than to ability; the opposite pattern has been found in the United States. Cultural patterns also shape responsibility attributions; V. Lee Ham- ilton and Shigeru Hagiwara (1992) found that U.S. (and male) respondents were more likely to deny responsibility for their own inappropriate behav- iors than were Japanese (and female) respondents, who were more likely to apologize for the behav- iors. Hamilton and Hagiwara argue that the Japa- nese (and women) were more concerned with maintaining the quality of the interaction between the accuser and the accused. SOCIOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS It may be useful to identify several sociological phenomena to which theories of attribution are relevant. A number of scholars have suggested integrating attribution theory and labeling theory (Crittenden 1983). Attribution occurs within an individual; labels are applied by a group. Judith Howard and Randy Levinson (1985) offer empiri- cal evidence that the process of applying a label is directly analogous to attribution. They report that the relationships between attribution information and jury verdicts are consistent with predictions based on a labeling perspective. Richard Della Fave (1980) demonstrates the importance of attribution for understanding a key but neglected aspect of stratification, namely, how it is that stratification systems become legitimated and accepted by those disadvantaged as well as by those advantaged by those systems. He draws heavily on attribution theory in developing a theory of legitimation and in identifying possible sources of delegitimation. Attribution is a significant social process that ranges widely from cognitive processes to collec- tive beliefs. The field is still imbalanced; more work has been done at the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels. There is evidence for both intergroup and societal attributions, however, and research at these two levels is steadily increasing (Hewstone 1989). Recent research has demon- strated connections across areas as diverse as so- cial cognition, social interaction, intergroup rela- tions, and social representations; these connections provide increasing evidence of the importance of attribution for sociological phenomena. Indeed, in the next decade it may be that the fruits of attribution theories will be evident more in re- search on these other topics, than in research on attribution alone. REFERENCES Anderson, Irina, and Geoffrey Beattie 1996 ‘‘How Im- portant is Kelley’s Model of the Attribution Process When Men and Women Discuss Rape in Conversa- tion?’’ ( Semiotica ½:1–21. Andrews, Bernice, and Chris R. Brewin 1990 ‘‘Attributions of Blame for Marital Violence: A Study of Antece- dents and Consequences.’’ Journal of Marriage and the Family 52:757–767. Antaki, Charles, and Ivan Leudar 1992 ‘‘Explaining in Conversation: Towards an Argument Model.’’ Euro- pean Journal of Social Psychology 22:181–194. Bond, Michael H. (ed.) 1988 The Cross-Cultural Challenge to Social Psychology . Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage. Broman, Clifford L. 1992 ‘‘The Black Experience: At- tributing the Causes of Labor Market Success.’’ Na- tional Journal of Sociology 6:77–90. Crittenden, Kathleen S. 1983 ‘‘Sociological Aspects of Attribution.’’ Annual Review of Sociology 9:425–446. ATTRIBUTION THEORY 199 Della Fave, L. Richard 1980 ‘‘The Meek Shall Not Inher- it the Earth: Self-Evaluation and the Legitimacy of Stratification.’’ American Sociological Review 45:955–971. Hamilton, V. Lee, and Shigeru Hagiwara 1992 ‘‘Roles, Responsibility, and Accounts Across Cultures.’’ Inter- national Journal of Psychology 27:157–179. Heider, Fritz 1958 The Psychology of Interpersonal Rela- tions . New York: Wiley. Hewstone, Miles 1989 Causal Attribution: From Cognitive Processes to Collective Beliefs . Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ———, and Jos M. F. Jaspars 1987 ‘‘Covariation and Causal Attribution: A Logical Model of the Intuitive Analysis of Variance.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 53:663–672. Howard, Judith A., and Carolyn Allen 1990 ‘‘Making Meaning: Revealing Attributions Through Analyses of Readers’ Responses.’’ Social Psychology Quarterly 52:280–298. Howard, Judith A., and Randy Levinson 1985 ‘‘The Overdue Courtship of Attribution and Labeling.’’ Social Psychology Quarterly 48:191–202. Jones, Edward E., and Keith E. Davis 1965 ‘‘From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Per- ception.’’ Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 2:219–266. Jones, Edward E., and Daniel McGillis 1976 ‘‘Corre- spondent Inferences and the Attribution Cube: A Comparative Reappraisal.’’ In J. H. Harvey, W. Ickes, and R. F. Kidd, eds., New Directions in Attribution Research , Vol. 1. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. Kelley, Harold H. 1967 ‘‘Attribution Theory in Social Psychology.’’ Nebraska Symposium of Motivation 15:192–238. ———1973 ‘‘The Processes of Causal Attribution.’’ Ameri- can Psychologist 28:107–128. Little, Steven G., Robert C. Sterling, and Daniel H. Tingstrom 1996 ‘‘The Influence of Geographic and Racial Cues on Evaluation of Blame.’’ The Journal of Social Psychology 136:373–379. McArthur, Leslie Z. 1972 ‘‘The How and What of Why: Some Determinants and Consequences of Causal Attribution.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psycholo- gy 22:171–197. McMillen, Curtis, and Susan Zuravin 1997 ‘‘Attributions of Blame and Responsibility for Child Sexual Abuse and Adult Adjustment.’’ Journal of Interpersonal Vio- lence 12:30–48. Miller, Joan G. 1984 ‘‘Culture and the Development of Everyday Social Explanation.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 46:961–978. Mizokawa, Donald T., and David B. Ryckman 1990 ‘‘Attributions of Academic Success and Failure: A Comparison of Six Asian-American Ethnic Groups.’’ Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 21:434–451. Moghaddam, Fathali M., Donald M. Taylor, Wallace E. Lambert, and Amy E. Schmidt 1995 ‘‘Attributions and Discrimination: A Study of Attributions to the Self, the Group, and External Factors among Whites, Blacks, and Cubans in Miami.’’ Journal of Cross-Cultur- al Psychology 26:209–220. Moscovici, Serge 1976 La Psychanalyse: Son image et son public , 2nd ed. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Moskowitz, G. B. 1996 ‘‘The Mediational Effects of Attributions and Information Processing in Minority Social Influence.’’ British Journal of Social Psychology 35:47–66. Power, J. Gerard, Sheila T. Murphy, and Gail Coover 1996 ‘‘Priming Prejudice: How Stereotypes and Coun- ter-Stereotypes Influence Attribution of Responsi- bility and Credibility among Ingroups and Outgroups.’’ Human Communication Research 23:36–58. Reese, Laura T., and Ronald E. Brown 1995 ‘‘The Effects of Religious Messages on Racial Identity and System Blame among African Americans.’’ The Jour- nal of Politics 57:24–43. Ross, Lee 1977 ‘‘The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Proc- ess.’’ Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 19:174–220. Singh, Anup K. 1989 ‘‘Attribution Research on Poverty: A Review.’’ Psychologia 32:143–148. Tuss, Paul, Jules Zimmer, and Hsiu-Zu Ho 1995 ‘‘Causal Attributions of Underachieving Fourth-Grade Stu- dents in China, Japan, and the United States.’’ Jour- nal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 26:408–425. Weiner, Bernard 1974 Achievement Motivation and Attri- bution Theory . Morristown, N.J.: General Learn- ing Press. ———1985 ‘‘’Spontaneous’ Causal Thinking.’’ Psycho- logical Bulletin 97:74–84. ———, Dan Russell, and David Lerman 1978 ‘‘Affective Consequences of Causal Ascription.’’ In J. H. Har- vey, W. Ickes., and R. F. Kidd, eds., New Directions in Attribution Research , Vol. 3. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. Wilder, David A., Andrew F. Simon, and Myles Faith 1996 ‘‘Enhancing the Impact of Counterstereotypic Information: Dispositional Attributions for Deviance.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71:276–287. Wiley, Mary Glenn, and Kathleen S. Crittenden 1992 ‘‘By Your Attributions You Shall Be Known: Conse- quences of Attributional Accounts for Professional and Gender Identities.’’ Sex Roles 27:259–276. ATTRIBUTION THEORY 200 Willis, Cynthia E., Marianne N. Hallinan, and Jeffrey Melby 1996 ‘‘Effects of Sex Role Stereotyping among European American Students on Domestic Violence Culpability Attributions.’’ Sex Roles 34:475–491. JUDITH A. HOWARD DANIELLE KANE 201 B BALANCE THEORY See Attitudes; Cognitive Consistency Theories. BANKRUPTCY AND CREDIT Every society must resolve the tension between debtors and creditors, especially if the debtors cannot pay or cannot pay quickly enough. Many of the world’s religions have condemned lending money for interest, at least among co-religionists. In traditional societies, money lenders, although necessary for ordinary commerce, were often viewed as morally suspect. The development of a robust capitalism was based upon raising capital by paying interest or dividends, and so it has been important for capitalist societies to develop insti- tutions and mechanisms for handling debt and credit. The inherent tension between creditors and debtors turns upon the creditor’s claim to justice as the property owner and the debtor’s interest in fairness in the terms of repayment. To be sure, lenders sometimes used their position to create social control mechanisms such that debtors often could never work their way out of debt. Such arrangements as sharecropping and the use of the company store often tied laborers to employers through the bonds of debt. With some exceptions, states and legal regimes upheld property rights against the claims of the debtors. Through the years, societies have sanctioned creditors’ use of slavery, debt-prison, transporta- tion to debtors’ colonies, debt-peonage, seizure of assets or garnishment of wages to control debtors. Most such methods, however, work to the advan- tage only of the first creditor or the most aggres- sive creditor to demand payment. Bankruptcy, as used in the United States and a number of other countries, provides a means for resolving not only the debtor-creditor conflict but also the potential conflict among creditors. Bankruptcy is a very old concept. The word itself comes from an Italian phrase meaning ‘‘broken bench,’’ because a bankrupt merchant’s work bench would be broken by his creditors if he could not repay the debt. In the United States, each state has laws governing debtor-creditor rela- tions, but the enactment of bankruptcy statutes is reserved to the Congress by the U.S. Constitution. United States bankruptcy occurs in the federal courts and is regulated by statutes enacted by Congress. Special bankruptcy courts are located in each federal judicial district, and specially appoint- ed bankruptcy judges oversee the caseload. Bank- ruptcy decisions may be appealed to the federal district court and subsequently to the federal ap- peals court and the U.S. Supreme Court. Bankruptcy is technically different from insol- vency. Insolvency refers to a financial situation in which a person or business has liabilities that exceed assets. To be bankrupt, the debtor must file for bankruptcy protection in the federal court. Although the overwhelming majority of individu- als filing for bankruptcy are also insolvent, occa- sionally a solvent business will file for bankruptcy because of anticipated liabilities that will exceed its assets. An example of such a bankruptcy is that of pharmaceutical manufacturer A. H. Robbins, whose BANKRUPTCY AND CREDIT 202 Dalkon Shield intrauterine device (a contracep- tive) was judged the cause of many injuries and some deaths among women who used it. As the financial judgments against the company mount- ed, its management sought the protection of the bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy allowed the com- pany to hold its creditors at bay for a period of time to allow the company to propose a financial settlement. THE ROLE OF THE STATES Although bankruptcy is a federal matter, states also have laws to govern debtor-creditor relations. Each state’s debtor-creditor laws are affected by its history and by the debt conventions that are part of its history. Before becoming a state, for exam- ple, Georgia was a debtor’s colony. Before the Civil War, debtors in such southern states often fled harsh debt-collection laws by going to Texas, indicated by ‘‘G.T.T.’’ in sheriffs’ records. Texas has traditionally retained pro-debtor statutory provi- sions, especially its generous exemption. An exemption is the property that a debtor may keep despite bankruptcy or a judgment for nonpayment. The federal bankruptcy statutes rec- ognize the right of state law to prescribe exemp- tions. There is also a federal exemption, but state legislatures may require their citizens to claim only the state exemption, which in some states is small- er than the federal exemption. State exemption laws vary widely, with some states allowing a sub- stantial exemption and other states exempting very little property. Even a generous exemption law, however, is not a guarantee that a debtor will keep a lot of property. A home is not exempt if there is a mortgage on the home, and other goods are similarly not protected from a secured creditor if they have been used as collateral for a debt. The states with a Spanish heritage often fol- lowed the Spanish tradition that a bankrupt’s fami- ly should have the means to continue to make a living. Thus, the state laws of Florida, Texas, and California, for example, have traditionally been liberal in permitting debtors to keep their home- steads and some other assets, such as the tools of their trade and current wages. Other states ex- empt items that are believed necessary for the family’s well being, such as children’s school books, certain farm equipment, sewing machines, and funeral plots. There is a recent trend toward sub- stituting dollar limitations for exemptions instead of listing specific items of property. The state exemption is the principal determi- nant of the resources a bankrupt debtor will have following the bankruptcy. The rest of the debtor’s postbankruptcy status depends upon the type of bankruptcy the debtor declares. TYPES OF BANKRUPTCY Bankruptcy may be entered either on a voluntary or on an involuntary basis. U.S. bankruptcy law arranges several ways by which debtors may volun- tarily declare bankruptcy. Either individuals or corporate actors, including incorporated and unincorporated businesses, not-for-profit agencies, and municipalities may declare bankruptcy. The law makes special provision for the bankruptcies of railroads and stockbrokers. Creditors may in some circumstances initiate an involuntary bank- ruptcy. Only a small proportion of all bankruptcies is involuntary, and nearly all of those cases are targeted toward a business. The Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court classifies each case filed as a business bankruptcy or a nonbusiness bankruptcy. These distinctions are not always clear-cut. As many as one in every five ‘‘nonbusiness’’ debtors reports currently owning a business or having recently owned a business. Moreover, many of the ‘‘business’’ bankruptcies are small family-owned enterprises. Whether clas- sified as business or nonbusiness, the bankruptcy of a small business owner typically affects the family’s welfare as well as that of the business. Individual, noncorporate debtors typically have two choices in bankruptcy: Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 13 repayment plan . In a Chapter 7 case, the debtor’s assets over and above the exempt property will be sold and the creditors will be paid pro rata . Creditors with secured debts (those debts with collateral) will be allowed to have the collater- al. All remaining debt will be discharged, or wiped away by the court. The debtor will not be able to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy again for six years. The Chapter 13 repayment plan is available only to individual debtors with a regular source of income. There are also other legal limitations, BANKRUPTCY AND CREDIT 203 such as maximum limits on the amount of debt owed. The debtor files with the court a plan for repaying debts over a three-to-five year schedule. The debtor must report all income to the court, and must also include a budget that provides the necessities of rent, food, clothing, medical treat- ment, and so on. The difference between the budgeted amount and the monthly income is the disposable income, which becomes the amount of the monthly payment. The Chapter 13 petitioner must pay to a trus- tee, who is appointed by the court, all disposable income for the period of the plan. The debtor gets to keep all property. The trustee disburses the funds to the creditors. For a judge to confirm a Chapter 13 plan, the unsecured creditors must receive more money through the plan payments than they would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation. At the conclusion of the plan, any remaining debt is discharged. Following this dis- charge, the Chapter 13 petitioner is also barred from further Chapter 7 bankruptcies for six years. About two of every three Chapter 13 filers do not complete the proposed plan. Although the Chapter 13 may provide some benefits to the debtor—for example, he might have time to reor- ganize his finances—once plan payments are missed the court may dismiss the Chapter 13 and the debtor loses the protection of bankruptcy. Repay- ment plans such as Chapter 13 were begun by bankruptcy judges in northern Alabama before Congress wrote them into law. Even today, Chap- ter 13 is disproportionately popular in some judi- cial districts in the South. About one-third of all nonbusiness bankruptcies are filed in Chapter 13. Some debts survive bankruptcy, regardless of the chapter in which the bankruptcy is filed. Child support, alimony, federally-backed educational loans, and some kinds of taxes are among those effectively nondischargeable in Chapter 7. Credi- tors may also object to the discharge of a specific debt if the debt arose from certain misbehavior, including fraud and drunkenness. Creditors may also object to the discharge generally on the grounds of debtor misbehavior, including hiding assets, disposing of assets before the bankruptcy, and lying to the court. A judge may object to a debtor filing in Chapter 7 if the judge believes that the filing represents a ‘‘substantial abuse.’’ A Chapter 13 plan must be filed in ‘‘good faith.’’ For persons with substantial assets and for businesses there is an additional choice, Chapter 11 , also called a reorganization . In Chapter 11, a debtor business seeks the protection of the court to reorganize itself in such a way that its creditors can be repaid (although perhaps not one hundred cents on the dollar). Creditors are given an oppor- tunity to review the plan and to vote on its accepta- bility. If a sufficient number of creditors agree, the others may be forced to go along. In large cases, a committee of creditors is often appointed for the duration of the Chapter 11. Reorganizations may provide a means to save jobs while a business reorganizes. In recent years, critics have charged that undo- ing business obligations has become an important motive for companies to reorganize under Chap- ter 11. Various companies have been accused of trying to avoid labor contracts, to avoid product liability, or to insulate management from chal- lenges. These strategic uses of bankruptcy are potentially available to solvent companies. Although strategic uses of bankruptcies by individuals prob- ably occur, most studies have found that the indi- viduals in bankruptcy are in poor financial condi- tion, often with debts in excess of three years’ income. There is also Chapter 12 bankruptcy, another type of reorganization specifically for farmers. It was introduced in 1986 and in most years between one and two thousand cases are filed in Chapter 12. Federal law permits the fact of a bankruptcy to remain on a credit record for ten years, but the law also prohibits discrimination against bankrupt debt- ors by governments or private employers. BANKRUPTCY TRENDS The number of business bankruptcies remains relatively small, usually fewer than 75,000 in a year, with exceptions in a few years. The number of nonbusiness bankruptcies, however, has gener- ally risen for about two decades, from about 313,000 in 1981 to 811,000 in 1991. Nonbusiness bank- ruptcies passed the millionmark in 1996, and by 1998 there were more than 1.4 million nonbusiness bankruptcies in the United States. Embedded within the general increase in bank- ruptcy are substantial regional variations in filing BANKRUPTCY AND CREDIT 204 rates that seem to follow the business cycle. Some analysts believe that bankruptcy is a lagging indica- tor; that is, some months after an economic slow- down, bankruptcies begin to rise as laid-off work- ers run out of resources or small business owners find they cannot remain in business. Each bankruptcy affects at least one house- hold, and one estimate puts the average number of creditors affected at eighteen. Some creditors, such as credit card issuers, are affected by numer- ous bankruptcies within a single year. Some bank- ruptcies initiate a chain of events: The bankruptcy of a single business may lead later to the bankrupt- cies of employees who lost their jobs, of creditors whose accounts receivable were never received, and of suppliers who could not find new custom- ers. Creditors often argue that the rising numbers of bankruptcies cause them costs that are then passed on to all consumers in the form of higher interest rates. A bankruptcy may be filed either by a single individual or jointly by a couple. Since the early 1980s, there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of bankruptcies filed by adult women. Several studies indicate between one-third and one-half of bankruptcies are now filed by women. Over half of bankrupt debtors are between the ages of thirty and fifty. Their mean occupational prestige is approximately the same as that of the labor force as a whole, and their educational level is also similar to that of the adult population. The proportion of immigrants in the bankrupt popula- tion is approximately the same as their proportion in the general population. There are conflicting findings about the extent to which minority popu- lations are overrepresented or underrepresented in bankruptcy. Despite their educational and occu- pational levels, however, the median incomes of bankrupt debtors are less than half the median income of the general population. CAUSES OF BANKRUPTCY Much of what social scientists know about bank- ruptcy comes from reviewing the bankruptcy peti- tions filed in courts, and from interviewing judges, lawyers, clerks, and others who work in the bank- ruptcy courts. Information about the causes of bankruptcy, however, typically comes from inter- views with the debtors themselves. Because many debtors are ashamed of their bankruptcies, and because American debtor populations are geo- graphically mobile, interview studies often have somewhat low response rates. For learning the cause of a bankruptcy, however, there is probably no substitute for asking the debtor. Debtors often report ‘‘inability to manage mon- ey’’ or ‘‘too much debt’’ as the reason for their bankruptcy. In pro