EpilogueINSTANT INFLUENCEPrimitive Consent for an Automatic AgeEvery day in every way, I’m getting better.
—EMILE COUEEvery day in every way, I’m getting busier.
—ROBERT CIALDINIBACK IN THE 1960S A MAN NAMED JOE PINE HOSTED A RATHER remark-able TV talk show that was syndicated from California.
The programwas made distinctive by Pine’s caustic and confrontational style withhis guests—for the most part, a collection of exposure-hungry entertain-ers, would-be celebrities, and representatives of fringe political or socialorganizations.
The host’s abrasive approach was designed to provokehis guests into arguments, to fluster them into embarrassing admissions,and generally to make them look foolish.
It was not uncommon for Pineto introduce a visitor and launch immediately into an attack on the in-dividual’s beliefs, talent, or appearance.
Some people claimed that Pine’sacid personal style was partially caused by a leg amputation that hadembittered him to life; others said no, that he was just vituperous bynature.
One evening rock musician Frank Zappa was a guest on the show.
This was at a time in the sixties when very long hair on men was still
unusual and controversial.
As soon as Zappa had been introduced andseated, the following exchange occurred😛INE: I guess your long hair makes you a girl.
ZAPPA: I guess your wooden leg makes you a table.
Aside from containing what may be my favorite ad-lib, the abovedialogue illustrates a fundamental theme of this book: Very often inmaking a decision about someone or something, we don’t use all therelevant available information; we use, instead, only a single, highlyrepresentative piece of the total.
And an isolated piece of information,even though it normally counsels us correctly, can lead us to clearlystupid mistakes—mistakes that, when exploited by clever others, leaveus looking silly or worse.
At the same time, a complicating companion theme has been presentthroughout this book: Despite the susceptibility to stupid decisions thataccompanies a reliance on a single feature of the available data, the paceof modern life demands that we frequently use this shortcut.
Recall thatearly in Chapter 1, our shortcut approach was likened to the automaticresponding of lower animals, whose elaborate behavior patterns couldbe triggered by the presence of a lone stimulus feature—a “cheep-cheep”sound, a shade of red breast feather, or a specific sequence of lightflashes.
The reason infrahumans must often rely on such solitary stim-ulus features is their restricted mental capability.
Their small brainscannot begin to register and process all the relevant information in theirenvironments.
So these species have evolved special sensitivities tocertain aspects of the information.
Because those selected aspects ofinformation are normally enough to cue a correct response, the systemis usually very efficient: Whenever a female turkey hears “cheep-cheep,”click, whirr, out rolls the proper maternal behavior in a mechanicalfashion that conserves much of her limited brainpower for dealing withthe variety of other situations and choices she must face in her day.
We, of course, have vastly more effective brain mechanisms thanmother turkeys, or any other animal group, for that matter.
We areunchallenged in the ability to take into account a multitude of relevantfacts and, consequently, to make good decisions.
Indeed, it is this in-formation-processing advantage over other species that has helpedmake us the dominant form of life on the planet.
Still, we have our capacity limitations, too; and, for the sake of effi-ciency, we must sometimes retreat from the time-consuming, sophistic-ated, fully informed brand of decision making to a more automatic,primitive, single-feature type of responding.
For instance, in deciding206 / Influence
whether to say yes or no to a requester, it is clear that we frequentlypay attention to but one piece of the relevant information in the situ-ation.
We have been exploring several of the most popular of the singlepieces of information that we use to prompt our compliance decisions.
They are the most popular prompts precisely because they are the mostreliable ones, those that normally point us toward the correct choice.
That is why we employ the factors of reciprocation, consistency, socialproof, liking, authority, and scarcity so often and so automatically inmaking our compliance decisions.
Each, by itself, provides a highly re-liable cue as to when we will be better off saying yes than no.
We are likely to use these lone cues when we don’t have the inclina-tion, time, energy, or cognitive resources to undertake a complete ana-lysis of the situation.
Where we are rushed, stressed, uncertain, indiffer-ent, distracted, or fatigued, we tend to focus on less of the informationavailable to us.
When making decisions under these circumstances, weoften revert to the rather primitive but necessary single-piece-of-good-evidence approach.
1 All this leads to a jarring insight: With the sophist-icated mental apparatus we have used to build world eminence as aspecies, we have created an environment so complex, fast-paced, andinformation-laden that we must increasingly deal with it in the fashionof the animals we long ago transcended.
John Stuart Mill, the British economist, political thinker, and philo-sopher of science, died more than a hundred years ago.
The year of hisdeath (1873) is important because he is reputed to have been the lastman to know everything there was to know in the world.
Today, thenotion that one of us could be aware of all known facts is only laughable.
After eons of slow accumulation, human knowledge has snowballedinto an era of momentum-fed, multiplicative, monstrous expansion.
We now live in a world where most of the information is less than fifteenyears old.
In certain fields of science alone (for example, physics),knowledge is said to double every eight years.
And the scientific inform-ation explosion is not limited to such arcane arenas as molecularchemistry or quantum physics but extends to everyday areas of know-ledge where we strive to keep ourselves current—health, child devel-opment, nutrition, and the like.
What’s more, this rapid growth is likelyto continue, since 90 percent of all scientists who have ever lived areworking today.
Apart from the streaking advance of science, things are quicklychanging much closer to home.
In his book Future Shock, Alvin Tofflerprovided early documentation of the unprecedented and increasingrapidity of modern daily life: We travel more and faster; we relocatemore frequently to new residences, which are built and torn down moreRobert B.
D / 207
quickly; we contact more people and have shorter relationships withthem; in the supermarket, car showroom, and shopping mall, we arefaced with an array of choices among styles and products that wereunheard of the previous year and may well be obsolete or forgotten bythe next.
Novelty, transience, diversity, and acceleration are acknow-ledged as prime descriptors of civilized existence.
This avalanche of information and choices is made possible by bur-geoning technological progress.
Leading the way are developments inour ability to collect, store, retrieve, and communicate information.
Atfirst, the fruits of such advances were limited to large organiza-tions—government agencies or powerful corporations.
For example,speaking as chairman of Citicorp, Walter Wriston could say of hiscompany, “We have tied together a data base in the world that is capableof telling almost anyone in the world, almost anything, immediately.
”2But now, with further developments in telecommunication and com-puter technology, access to such staggering amounts of information isfalling within the reach of individual citizens.
Extensive cable andsatellite television systems provide one route for that information intothe average home.
The other major route is the personal computer.
In 1972, NormanMacrae, an editor of The Economist, speculated prophetically about atime in the future:The prospect is, after all, that we are going to enter an age whenany duffer sitting at a computer terminal in his laboratory or officeor public library or home can delve through unimaginable in-creased mountains of information in mass-assembly data bankswith mechanical powers of concentration and calculation that willbe greater by a factor of tens of thousands than was ever availableto the human brain of even an Einstein.
One short decade later, Time magazine signaled that Macrae’s futureage had arrived by naming a machine, the personal computer, as itsMan of the Year.
Time’s editors defended their choice by citing theconsumer “stampede” to purchase small computers and by arguingthat “America [and], in a larger perspective, the entire world will neverbe the same.
” Macrae’s vision is now being realized.
Millions of ordinary“duffers” are sitting at machines with the potential to present andanalyze enough data to bury an Einstein.
Because technology can evolve much faster than we can, our naturalcapacity to process information is likely to be increasingly inadequateto handle the surfeit of change, choice, and challenge that is character-istic of modern life.
More and more frequently, we will find ourselves208 / Influence
in the position of the lower animals—with a mental apparatus that isunequipped to deal thoroughly with the intricacy and richness of theoutside environment.
Unlike the animals, whose cognitive powers havealways been relatively deficient, we have created our own deficiencyby constructing a radically more complex world.
But the consequenceof our new deficiency is the same as that of the animals’ long-standingone.
When making a decision, we will less frequently enjoy the luxuryof a fully consid-ered analysis of the total situation but will revert in-creasingly to a focus on a single, usually reliable feature of it.
When those single features are truly reliable, there is nothing inher-ently wrong with the shortcut approach of narrowed attention andautomatic response to a particular piece of information.
The problemcomes when something causes the normally trustworthy cues to counselus poorly, to lead us to erroneous actions and wrongheaded decisions.
As we have seen, one such cause is the trickery of certain compliancepractitioners who seek to profit from the rather mindless and mechan-ical nature of shortcut response.
If, as seems true, the frequency ofshortcut response is increasing with the pace and form of modern life,we can be sure that the frequency of this trickery is destined to increaseas well.
What can we do about the expected intensified attack on our systemof shortcuts?
More than evasive action, I would urge forceful counter-assault.
There is an important qualification, however.
Complianceprofessionals who play fairly by the rules of shortcut response are notto be considered the enemy; on the contrary, they are our allies in anefficient and adaptive process of exchange.
The proper targets forcounteraggression are only those individuals who falsify, counterfeit,or misrepresent the evidence that naturally cues our shortcut responses.
Let’s take an illustration from what is perhaps our most frequentlyused shortcut.
According to the principle of social proof, we often decideto do what other people like us are doing.
It makes all kinds of sensesince, most of the time, an action that is popular in a given situation isalso functional and appropriate.
Thus, an advertiser who, without usingdeceptive statistics, provides information that a brand of toothpaste isthe largest selling or fastest growing has offered us valuable evidenceabout the quality of the product and the probability that we will likeit.
Provided that we are in the market for a tube of good toothpaste, wemight want to rely on that single piece of information, popularity, todecide to try it.
This strategy will likely steer us right, will unlikely steerus far wrong, and will conserve our cognitive energies for dealing withthe rest of our increasingly information-laden, decision-overloadedenvironment.
The advertiser who allows us to use effectively this effi-Robert B.
D / 209
cient strategy is hardly our antagonist but rather must be considered acooperating partner.
The story becomes quite different, however, should a compliancepractitioner try to stimulate a shortcut response by giving us a fraudu-lent signal for it.
The enemy is the advertiser who seeks to create animage of popularity for a brand of toothpaste by, say, constructing aseries of staged “unrehearsed-interview” commercials in which an arrayof actors posing as ordinary citizens praise the product.
Here, wherethe evidence of popularity is counterfeit, we, the principle of socialproof, and our shortcut response to it, are all being exploited.
In anearlier chapter, I recommended against the purchase of any productfeatured in a faked “unrehearsed-interview” ad, and I urged that wesend the product manufacturers letters detailing the reason and suggest-ing that they dismiss their advertising agency.
I would recommendextending this aggressive stance to any situation in which a complianceprofessional abuses the principle of social proof (or any other weaponof influence) in this manner.
We should refuse to watch TV programsthat use canned laughter.
If we see a bartender beginning a shift bysalting his tip jar with a bill or two of his own, he should get none fromus.
If, after waiting in line outside a nightclub, we discover from theamount of available space that the wait was designed to impress pass-ersby with false evidence of the club’s popularity, we should leave im-mediately and announce our reason to those still in line.
In short, weshould be willing to use boycott, threat, confrontation, censure, tirade,nearly anything, to retaliate.
I don’t consider myself pugnacious by nature, but I actively advocatesuch belligerent actions because in a way I am at war with the ex-ploiters—we all are.
It is important to recognize, however, that theirmotive for profit is not the cause for hostilities; that motive, after all, issomething we each share to an extent.
The real treachery, and the thingwe cannot tolerate, is any attempt to make their profit in a way thatthreatens the reliability of our shortcuts.
The blitz of modern daily lifedemands that we have faithful shortcuts, sound rules of thumb to handleit all.
These are not luxuries any longer; they are out-and-out necessitiesthat figure to become increasingly vital as the pulse of daily life quick-ens.
That is why we should want to retaliate whenever we see someonebetraying one of our rules of thumb for profit.
We want that rule to beas effective as possible.
But to the degree that its fitness for duty isregularly undercut by the tricks of a profiteer, we naturally will use itless and will be less able to cope efficiently with the decisional burdensof our day.
We cannot allow that without a fight.
The stakes have gottentoo high.
210 / Influence
NOTESCHAPTER 1 (PAGES 1–16)1.
Honest, this animal researcher’s name is Fox.
See his 1974 mono-graph for a complete description of the turkey and polecat experiment.
Sources for the robin and bluethroat information are Lack (1943)and Peiponen (1960), respectively.
Although several important similarities exist between this kind ofautomatic responding in humans and lower animals, there are someimportant differences as well.
The automatic behavior sequences ofhumans tend to be learned rather than inborn, more flexible than thelock-step patterns of the lower animals, and responsive to a largernumber of triggers.
Perhaps the common “because…just because” response of childrenasked to explain their behavior can be traced to their shrewd recognitionof the unusual amount of power adults appear to assign to the rawword because.
The reader who wishes to find a more systematic treatment of Langer’sXerox study and her conceptualization of it can do so in Langer (1989).
Sources for the Photuris and the blenny information are Lloyd (1965)and Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1958), respectively.
As exploitative as these creaturesseem, they are topped in this respect by an insect known as the rovebeetle.
By using a variety of triggers involving smell and touch, the rovebeetles get two species of ants to protect, groom, and feed them as larvaeand to harbor them for the winter as adults.
Responding mechanicallyto the beetles’ trick trigger features, the ants treat the beetles as thoughthey were fellow ants.
Inside the ant nests, the beetles respond to theirhosts’ hospitality by eating ant eggs and young, yet they are neverharmed (Hölldobler, 1971).
These studies are reported by Kenrick and Gutierres (1980), whowarn that the unrealistically attractive people portrayed in the popularmedia (for example, actors, actresses, models) may cause us to be less
satisfied with the looks of the genuinely available romantic possibilitiesaround us.
More recent work by these authors takes their argument astep farther, showing that exposure to the exaggerated sexual attract-iveness of nude pinup bodies (in such magazines as Playboy and Playgirl)causes people to become less pleased with the sexual desirability oftheir current spouse or live-in mate (Kenrick, Gutierres, and Goldberg,1989).
CHAPTER 2 (PAGES 17–56)1.
A formal description of the greeting-card study is provided in Kunzand Woolcott (1976).
Certain societies have formalized the rule into ritual.
Consider forexample the “Vartan Bhanji,” an institutionalized custom of the giftexchange common to parts of Pakistan and India.
In commenting uponthe “Vartan Bhanji,” Gouldner (1960) remarks:It is…notable that the system painstakingly prevents the totalelimination of outstanding obligations.
Thus, on the occasion ofa marriage, departing guests are given gifts of sweets.
In weighingthem out, the hostess may say, “These five are yours,” meaning“These are a repayment for what you formerly gave me,” and thenshe adds an extra measure, saying, “These are mine.
” On the nextoccasion, she will receive these back along with an additionalmeasure which she later returns, and so on.
The quote is from Leakey and Lewin (1978).
For a fuller discussion, see Tiger and Fox (1971).
The experiment is reported formally in Regan (1971).
The statement appears in Mauss (1954).
Surprise is an effective compliance producer in its own right.
Peoplewho are surprised by a request will often comply because they aremomentarily unsure of themselves and, consequently, influenced easily.
For example, the social psychologists Stanley Milgram and John Sabini(1975) have shown that people riding on the New York subway weretwice as likely to give up their seats to a person who surprised themwith the request “Excuse me.
May I have your seat?
” than to one whoforewarned them first by mentioning to a fellow passenger that he wasthinking of asking for someone’s seat (56 percent vs.
It is interesting that a cross-cultural study has shown that thosewho break the reciprocity rule in the reverse direction—by givingwithout allowing the recipient an opportunity to repay—are also dis-liked for it.
This result was found to hold for each of the three national-212 / Influence
ities investigated—Americans, Swedes, and Japanese.
See Gergen et al.
(1975) for an account of the study.
The Pittsburgh study was done by Greenberg and Shapiro.
Thedata on women’s sexual obligations were collected by George, Gournic,and McAfee (1988).
To convince ourselves that this result was no fluke, we conductedtwo more experiments testing the effectiveness of the rejection-then-retreat trick.
Both showed results similar to the first experiment.
SeeCialdini et al.
(1975) for the details of all three.
The Israeli study was conducted in 1979 by Schwartzwald, Raz,and Zvibel.
The TV Guide article appeared in December 1978.
The source for the quotes is Magruder (1974).
Consumer Reports, January 1975, p.
Another way of gauging the effectiveness of a request techniqueis to examine the bottom-line proportion of individuals who, after beingasked, complied with the request.
Using such a measure, the rejection-then-retreat procedure was more than four times more effective thanthe procedure of asking for the smaller request only.
See Miller et al.
(1976) for a complete description of the study.
The blood-donation study was reported by Cialdini and Ascani(1976).
The UCLA study was performed by Benton, Kelley, and Lieblingin 1972.
A variety of other business operations use the no-cost informationoffer extensively.
Pest-exterminator companies, for instance, have foundthat most people who agree to a free home examination give the exterm-ination job to the examining company, provided they are convincedthat it is needed.
They apparently feel an obligation to give their businessto the firm that rendered the initial, complimentary service.
Knowingthat such customers are unlikely to comparisonshop for this reason,unscrupulous pest-control operators will take advantage of the situationby citing higher-than-competitive prices for work commissioned in thisway.
CHAPTER 3 (PAGES 57–113)1.
The racetrack study was done twice, with the same results, by Knoxand Inkster (1968).
See Rosenfeld, Kennedy, and Giacalone (1986) forevidence that the tendency to believe more strongly in choices, oncemade, applies to guesses in a lottery game, too.
It is important to note that the collaboration was not always inten-tional.
The American investigators defined collaboration as “any kindRobert B.
D / 213
of behavior which helped the enemy,” and it thus included such diverseactivities as signing peace petitions, running errands, making radioappeals, accepting special favors, making false confessions, informingon fellow prisoners, or divulging military information.
The Schein quote comes from his 1956 article “The Chinese Indoc-trination Program for Prisoners of War: A Study of Attempted Brain-washing.
See Greene (1965) for the source of this advice.
Freedman and Fraser published their data in the Journal of Person-ality and Social Psychology, in 1966.
The quote comes from Freedman and Fraser (1966).
See Segal (1954) for the article from which this quote originates.
See Jones and Harris (1967).
It is noteworthy that the housewives in this study (Kraut, 1973)heard that they were considered charitable at least a full week beforethey were asked to donate to the Multiple Sclerosis Association.
From “How to Begin Retailing,” Amway Corporation.
See Deutsch and Gerard (1955) and Kerr and MacCoun (1985) forthe details of these studies.
From Whiting, Kluckhohn, and Anthony (1958).
From Gordon and Gordon (1963).
The survey was conducted by Walker (1967).
The electric-shock experiment was published seven years afterthe Aronson and Mills (1959) study by Gerard and Mathewson (1966).
Young (1965) conducted this research.
The robot study is reported fully in Freedman (1965).
The reader who wishes stronger evidence for the action of thelowball tactic than my subjective observations in the car showroommay refer to articles that attest to its effectiveness under controlled,experimental conditions: Cialdini et al.
(1978), Burger and Petty (1981),Brownstein and Katzev (1985), and Joule (1987).
A formal report of the energy-conservation project appears inPallak et al.
It is not altogether unusual for even some of our most familiarquotations to be truncated by time in ways that greatly modify theircharacter.
For example, it is not money that the Bible claims as the rootof all evil, it is the love of money.
So as not to be guilty of the same sortof error myself, I should note that the Emerson quote from “Self-Reli-ance” is somewhat longer and substantially more textured than I havereported.
In full, it reads, “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin oflittle minds adored by little statesmen, and philosophers, and divines.
See Zajonc (1980) for a summary of this evidence.
This is not to say that what we feel about an issue is always differ-214 / Influence
ent from or always to be trusted more than what we think about it.
However, the data are clear that our emotions and beliefs often do notpoint in the same direction.
Therefore, in situations involving a decision-al commitment likely to have generated supporting rationalizations,feelings may well provide the truer counsel.
This would be especiallyso when, as in the question of Sara’s happiness, the fundamental issueat hand concerns an emotion (Wilson, 1989).
CHAPTER 4 (PAGES 114–166)1.
The general evidence regarding the facilitative effect of cannedlaughter on responses to humor comes from such studies as Smyth andFuller (1972), Fuller and Sheehy-Skeffinton (1974), and Nosanchuk andLightstone the last of which contains the indication that canned laughteris most effective for poor material.
The researchers who infiltrated the Graham Crusade and whoprovided the quote are Altheide and Johnson (1977).
See Bandura, Grusec, and Menlove (1967) and Bandura and Men-love (1968) for full descriptions of the dog-phobia treatment.
Any reader who doubts that the seeming appropriateness of an actionis importantly influenced by the number of others performing it mighttry a small experiment.
Stand on a busy sidewalk, pick out an emptyspot in the sky or on a tall building, and stare at it for a full minute.
Very little will happen around you during that time—most people willwalk past without glancing up, and virtually no one will stop to starewith you.
Now, on the next day, go to the same place and bring alongfour friends to look upward too.
Within sixty seconds, a crowd ofpassersby will have stopped to crane their necks skyward with thegroup.
For those pedestrians who do not join you, the pressure to lookup at least briefly will be nearly irresistible; if your experiment bringsthe same results as the one performed by three New York social psycho-logists, you and your friends will cause 80 percent of all passersby tolift their gaze to your empty spot (Milgram, Bickman, and Berkowitz,1967).
Other research besides O’Connor’s (1972) suggests that there aretwo sides to the filmed-social-proof coin, however.
The dramatic effectof filmed depictions on what children find appropriate has been a sourceof great distress for those concerned with frequent instances of violenceand aggression on television.
Although the consequences of televisedviolence on the aggressive actions of children are far from simple, thedata from a well-controlled experiment by psychologists Robert Liebertand Robert Baron (1972) have an ominous look.
Some children wereshown excerpts from a television program in which people intentionallyRobert B.
D / 215
Afterward, these children were significantly moreharmful toward another child than were children who had watched anonviolent television program (a horserace).
The finding that seeingothers perform aggressively led to more aggression on the part of theyoung viewers held true for the two age groups tested (five-to-six-year-olds and eight-to-nine-year-olds) and for both girls and boys.
An engagingly written report of their complete findings ispresented in Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter’s (1956) book WhenProphecy Fails.
Perhaps because of the quality of ragged desperation with whichthey approached their task, the believers were wholly unsuccessful atenlarging their number.
Not a single convert was gained.
At that point,in the face of the twin failures of physical and social proof, the cultquickly disintegrated.
Less than three weeks after the date of the pre-dicted flood, group members were scattered and maintaining onlysporadic communication with one another.
In one final—and ironic—dis-confirmation of prediction, it was the movement that perished in theflood.
Ruin has not always been the fate of doomsday groups whose predic-tions proved unsound, however.
When such groups have been able tobuild social proof for their beliefs through effective recruitment efforts,they have grown and prospered.
For example, when the Dutch Ana-baptists saw their prophesied year of destruction, 1533, pass unevent-fully, they became rabid seekers after converts, pouring unprecedentedamounts of energy into the cause.
One extraordinarily eloquent mission-ary, Jakob van Kampen, is reported to have baptized one hundredpersons in a single day.
So powerful was the snowballing social evidencein support of the Anabaptist position that it rapidly overwhelmed thedisconfirming physical evidence and turned two thirds of the populationof Holland’s great cities into adherents.
From Rosenthal’s Thirty-eight Witnesses, 1964.
This quote comes from Latané and Darley’s award-winning book(1968), where they introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance.
The potentially tragic consequences of the pluralistic ignorance phe-nomenon are starkly illustrated in a UPI news release from Chicago:A university coed was beaten and strangled in daylight hours nearone of the most popular tourist attractions in the city, police saidSaturday.
The nude body of Lee Alexis Wilson, 23, was found Friday indense shrubbery alongside the wall of the Art Institute by a 12-year-old boy playing in the bushes.
216 / Influence
Police theorized she may have been sitting or standing by afountain in the Art Institute’s south plaza when she was attacked.
The assailant apparently then dragged her into the bushes.
Sheapparently was sexually assaulted, police said.
Police said thousands of persons must have passed the site andone man told them he heard a scream about 2 P.
but did not in-vestigate because no one else seemed to be paying attention.
The New York “seizure” and “smoke” emergency studies are re-ported by Darley and Latané (1968) and Latané and Darley (1968), re-spectively.
The Toronto experiment was performed by Ross (1971).
TheFlorida studies were published by Clark and Word in 1972 and 1974.
See a study by Latané and Rodin (1969) showing that groups ofstrangers help less in an emergency than groups of acquaintances.
The wallet study was conducted by Hornstein et al.
(1968), theantismoking study by Murray et al.
(1984), and the dental anxiety studyby Melamed et al.
The sources of these statistics are articles by Phillips in 1979 and1980.
The newspaper story data are reported by Phillips (1974), whilethe TV story data come from Bollen and Phillips (1982), Gould andSchaffer (1986), Phillips and Carstensen (1986), and Schmidtke andHafner (1988).
These new data appear in Phillips (1983).
The quote is from The International Cyclopedia of Music and Musi-cians, 1964, which Sabin edited.
From Hornaday (1887).
CHAPTER 5 (PAGES 167–207)1.
The Canadian election study was reported by Efran and Patterson(1976).
Data of this sort give credence to the claim of some RichardNixon backers that the failure that contributed most to the loss of the1960 TV debates with John F.
Kennedy—and thereby to the elec-tion—was the poor performance of Nixon’s makeup man.
See Mack and Rainey (1990).
This finding—that attractive defendants, even when they are foundguilty, are less likely to be sentenced to prison—helps explain one ofthe more fascinating experiments in criminology I have heard of (Kur-tzburg et al.
Some New York City jail inmates with facial disfig-urements were given plastic surgery while incarcerated; others withsimilar disfigurements were not.
Furthermore, some of each of thesetwo groups of criminals were given services (for example, counselingRobert B.
D / 217
and training) designed to rehabilitate them to society.
One year aftertheir release, a check of the records revealed that (except for heroinaddicts) those given the cosmetic surgery were significantly less likelyto have returned to jail.
The most interesting feature of this finding wasthat it was equally true for those criminals who had not received thetraditional rehabilitative services as for those who had.
Apparently,some criminologists then argued, when it comes to ugly inmates, prisonswould be better off to abandon the costly rehabilitation treatments theytypically provide and offer plastic surgery instead; the surgery seemsto be at least as effective and decidedly less expensive.
The importance of the newer, Pennsylvania data (Stewart, 1980) isits suggestion that the argument for surgery as a means of rehabilitationmay be faulty.
Making an ugly criminal more attractive may not reducethe chances that he will commit another crime; it may only reduce hischances of being sent to jail for it.
The negligence-award study was done by Kulka and Kessler (1978),the helping study by Benson et al.
(1976), and the persuasion study byChaiken (1979).
An excellent review of this research is provided by Eagly et al.
The dime-request experiment was conducted by Emswiller et al.
(1971), while the petition-signing experiment was done by Suedfeld etal.
The insurance sales data were reported by Evans (1963).
The“mirroring and matching” evidence comes from work by LaFrance(1985), Locke and Horowitz (1990), and Woodside and Davenport (1974).
Additional work suggests yet another reason for caution when dealingwith similar requesters: We typically underestimate the degree to whichsimilarity affects our liking for another (Gonzales et al.
See Drachman et al.
(1978) for a complete description of the find-ings.
Bornstein (1989) summarizes much of this evidence.
The mirror study was performed by Mita et al.
For general evidence regarding the positive effect of familiarityon attraction, see Zajonc (1968).
For more specific evidence of this effecton our response to politicians, the research of Joseph Grush is enlight-ening and sobering (Grush et al.
, 1978; Grush, 1980), in documenting astrong connection between amount of media exposure and a candidate’schances of winning an election.
See Bornstein, Leone, and Galley (1987).
For an especially thorough examination of this issue, see Stephan(1978).
The evidence of the tendency of ethnic groups to stay with their218 / Influence
own in school comes from Gerard and Miller (1975).
The evidence forthe dislike of things repeatedly presented under unpleasant conditionscomes from such studies as Burgess and Sales (1971), Zajonc et al.
(1974),and Swap (1977).
From Aronson (1975).
A fascinating description of the entire boys’-camp project, calledthe “Robbers’ Cave Experiment,” can be found in Sherif et al.
The Carlos example comes once again from Aronson’s initial reportin his 1975 article.
However, additional reports by Aronson and byothers have shown similarly encouraging results.
A representative listwould include Johnson and Johnson (1983), DeVries and Slavin (1978),Cook (1990), and Aronson, Bridgeman, and Geffner (1978a, b).
For a careful examination of the possible pitfalls of cooperativelearning approaches, see Rosenfield and Stephan (1981).
In truth, little in the way of combat takes place when the salesmanenters the manager’s office under such circumstances.
Often, becausethe salesman knows exactly the price below which he cannot go, heand the boss don’t even speak.
In one car dealership I infiltrated whileresearching this book, it was common for a salesman to have a softdrink or cigarette in silence while the boss continued working at hisdesk.
After a seemly time, the salesman would loosen his tie and returnto his customers, looking weary but carrying the deal he had just“hammered out” for them—the same deal he had in mind before enter-ing the boss’s office.
For experimental evidence of the validity of Shakespeare’s obser-vation, see Manis et al.
A review of research supporting this statement is provided byLott and Lott (1965).
See the study by Miller et al.
(1966) for evidence.
The study was done by Smith and Engel (1968).
The rights to such associations don’t come cheaply.
Corporatesponsors spend millions to secure Olympic sponsorships, and theyspend many millions more to advertise their connections to the event.
Yet it may all be worth the expense.
An Advertising Age survey foundthat one third of all consumers said they would be more likely to pur-chase a product if it were linked to the Olympics.
The Georgia study was done by Rosen and Tesser (1970).
From Asimov (1975).
Both the sweatshirt and the pronoun experiments are reportedfully in Cialdini et al.
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CHAPTER 6 (PAGES 208–236)1.
The quote is from Milgram’s 1963 article in the Journal of Abnormaland Social Psychology.
All of these variations on the basic experiment, as well as severalothers, are presented in Milgram’s highly readable book Obedience toAuthority, 1974.
A review of much of the subsequent research on obed-ience can be found in Blass (1991).
In fact, Milgram first began his investigations in an attempt to un-derstand how the German citizenry could have participated in theconcentration-camp destruction of millions of innocents during theyears of Nazi ascendancy.
After testing his experimental procedures inthe United States, he had planned to take them to Germany, a countrywhose populace he was sure would provide enough obedience for afull-blown scientific analysis of the concept.
That first eye-opening ex-periment in New Haven, Connecticut, however, made it clear that hecould save his money and stay close to home.
“I found so much obedi-ence,” he has said, “I hardly saw the need of taking the experiment toGermany.
”More telling evidence, perhaps, of a willingness within the Americancharacter to submit to authorized command comes from a nationalsurvey taken after the trial of Lieutenant William Calley, who orderedhis soldiers to kill the inhabitants—from the infants and toddlersthrough their parents and grandparents—of My Lai, Vietnam (Kelmanand Hamilton, 1989).
A majority of Americans (51 percent) respondedthat, if so ordered, in a similar context, they too would shoot all theresidents of a Vietnamese village.
But Americans have no monopolyon the need to obey.
When Milgram’s basic procedure has been repeatedin Holland, Germany, Spain, Italy, Australia, and Jordan, the resultshave been similar.
See Meeus and Raaijmakers for a review.
We are not the only species to give sometimes wrongheaded defer-ence to those in authority positions.
In monkey colonies, where rigiddominance hierarchies exist, beneficial innovations (like learning howto use a stick to bring food into the cage area) do not spread quicklythrough the group unless they are taught first to a dominant animal.
When a lower animal is taught the new concept first, the rest of thecolony remains mostly oblivious to its value.
One study, cited by Ardry(1970), on the introduction of new food tastes to Japanese monkeysprovides a nice illustration.
In one troop, a taste for caramels was de-veloped by introducing this new food into the diet of young peripherals,low on the status ladder.
The taste for caramels inched slowly up theranks: A year and a half later, only 51 percent of the colony had acquired220 / Influence
it, and still none of the leaders.
Contrast this with what happened in asecond troop where wheat was introduced first to the leader: Wheateating—to this point unknown to these monkeys—spread through thewhole colony within four hours.
The experiment was performed by Wilson (1968).
The study on children’s judgments of coins was done by Brunerand Goodman (1947).
The study on college students’ judgments wasdone by Dukes and Bevan (1952).
In addition to the relationship betweenimportance (status) and perceived size that both of these experimentsshow, there is even some evidence that the importance we assign toour identity is reflected in the size of a frequent symbol of that identity:our signature.
The psychologist Richard Zweigenhaft (1970) has collec-ted data suggesting that as a man’s sense of his own status grows, sodoes the size of his signature.
This finding may give us a secret way ofdiscovering how the people around us view their own status and im-portance: Simply compare the size of their signature to that of theirother handwriting.
Subhumans are not alone in this regard, even in modern times.
Forexample, since 1900 the U.
presidency has been won by the taller ofthe major-party candidates in twenty-one of the twenty-four elections.
From Hofling et al.
Additional data collected in the same study suggest that nursesmay not be conscious of the extent to which the title Doctor sways theirjudgments and actions.
A separate group of thirty-three nurses andstudent nurses were asked what they would have done in the experi-mental situation.
Contrary to the actual findings, only two predictedthat they would have given the medication as ordered.
See Bickman (1974) for a complete account of this research.
Similarresults have been obtained when the requester was female (Bushman,1988).
This experiment was conducted by Lefkowitz, Blake, and Mouton(1955).
The horn-honking study was published in 1968 by Anthony Dooband Alan Gross.
For evidence, see Choo (1964), and McGuinnies and Ward (1980).
See Settle and Gorden (1974), Smith and Hunt (1978), and Hunt,Domzal, and Kernan (1981).
CHAPTER 7 (PAGES 237–272)1.
The home-insulation study was done by Gonzales, Costanzo, andAronson (1988) in northern California; the breast-examination workwas conducted by Meyerwitz and Chaiken (1987) in New York City.
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See Schwartz (1980) for evidence of such a process.
See Lynn (1989).
Without wishing to minimize the advantages ofthis type of shortcut or the dangers associated with it, I should notethat these advantages and dangers are essentially the same ones wehave examined in previous chapters.
Accordingly, I will not focus onthis theme in the remainder of the present chapter, except to say at thispoint that the key to using properly the shortcut feature of scarcity isto be alert to the distinction between naturally occurring, honest scarcityand the fabricated variety favored by certain compliance practitioners.
The original reactance-theory formulation appeared in Brehm(1966); a subsequent version appears in Brehm and Brehm (1981).
Brehm and Weintraub (1977) did the barrier experiment.
It shouldbe noted that two-year-old girls in the study did not show the sameresistant response to the large barrier as did the boys.
This does notseem to be because girls don’t oppose attempts to limit their freedoms.
Instead, it appears that they are primarily reactant to restrictions thatcome from other people rather than from physical barriers (Brehm,1983).
For descriptions of the two-year-old’s change in self-perception,see Mahler et al.
(1975), Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979), Brooks-Gunand Lewis (1982), and Levine (1983).
The occurrence of the Romeo and Juliet effect should not be inter-preted as a warning to parents to be always accepting of their teenagers’romantic choices.
New players at this delicate game are likely to erroften and, consequently, would benefit from the direction of an adultwith greater perspective and experience.
In providing such direction,parents should recognize that teenagers, who see themselves as youngadults, will not respond well to control attempts that are typical ofparent-child relationships.
Especially in the clearly adult arena of mat-ing, adult tools of influence (preference and persuasion) will be moreeffective than traditional forms of parental control (prohibitions andpunishments).
Although the experience of the Montague and Capuletfamilies is an extreme example, heavy-handed restrictions on a youngromantic alliance may well turn it clandestine, torrid, and sad.
A full description of the Colorado couples study can be found inDriscoll et al.
See Mazis (1975) and Mazis et al.
(1973) for formal reports of thephosphate study.
For evidence, see Ashmore et al.
(1971), Wicklund and Brehm(1974), Worchel and Arnold (1973), Worchel et al.
(1975), and Worchel(1991).
The Purdue study was done by Zellinger et al.
222 / Influence
The University of Chicago jury experiment on inadmissibleevidence was reported by Broeder (1959).
The initial statements of commodity theory appeared in Brock(1968) and Fromkin and Brock (1971).
For an updated statement, seeBrock and Bannon (1992).
For ethical reasons, the information provided to the customerswas always true.
There was an impending beef shortage and this newshad, indeed, come to the company through its exclusive sources.
SeeKnishinsky (1982) for full details of the project.
Worchel et al.
See Davies (1962, 1969).
See Lytton (1979), and Rosenthal and Robertson (1959).
The quote comes from MacKenzie (1974).
EPILOGUE (PAGES 273–280)1.
For evidence of such perceptual and decisional narrowing seeBerkowitz (1967), Bodenhausen (1990), Cohen (1978), Easterbrook (1959),Gilbert and Osborn (1989), Hockey and Hamilton (1970), Mackworth(1965), Milgram (1970), and Tversky and Kahnemann (1974).
Quoted in the PBS-TV documentary The Information Society.
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